

PRESUPPOSITIONS IN CONTEXT

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Abstract: *A central issue in semantics and pragmatics is to understand how various different aspects of meaning contribute to the overall conveyed meaning of an utterance. Asserted content, implicatures, and presuppositions are commonly assumed to differ in terms of their source, their status, and their interaction with the context in the theoretical literature. This theoretical background, and reviews the experimental literature on related phenomena in some detail, with a focus on presuppositions. In the course of this, the contributions to the present article are situated in the context of previous work. The article provides an outlook on future directions of presuppositions in context.*

However, at least since the middle of the 20th century, the prima facie non-logical aspects of language have been taken to be the subject of rigorous formal analysis themselves. One of the earliest relevant discussions involved the analysis of definite descriptions.

While subsequent debates about definite descriptions continue to this day, it soon became clear that there is a wide range of expressions that systematically exhibit properties similar to those found with definites.

Açar sözlər: fərziyyə, güman etmək, uyğun nəticə, nəzərdə tutulan məzmun, linqvistik kontekst, fərziyyənin təfsirinin artımlı effektləri

Key words: presupposition, assume, relevant inference, presupposed content, linguistic context, incremental effects of presupposition interpretation

Ключевые слова: предубеждение, предполагать, соответствующий вывод, предполагаемое содержание, языковой контекст, дополнительные эффекты интерпретации предпосылок

In particular, presuppositions are commonly assumed to have two key characteristics (Karttunen, 1973; Stalnaker, 1973, 1974). First, they (at least typically) do not convey any new information, but rather consist of backgrounded information that the interlocutors take for granted (at least for purposes of the conversation). Secondly, they remain present at the level of the overall sentence even when introduced under embedding operators that (loosely speaking) cancel the literal at-issue content. Consider the example in (1), where the verb *stop* introduces the presupposition that whatever activity is expressed by the verb phrase is something that has gone on prior to some contextually salient time in the past (introduced by the past tense), and the assertion that this activity was not going on after the relevant point in time. [3,127]

(1) John stopped smoking. Presupposed and asserted content behave very differently in so-called family of sentences environments (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 1990), which include variations such as the following:

(2) a. John didn't stop smoking. b. If John stopped smoking, then he should be healthier now. c. John might have stopped smoking. d. Did John stop smoking?

None of the sentences in (2) convey what's asserted in (1) - that John's smoking did not go on after a salient point in time. They either convey the opposite (in the case of negation), or remain neutral in that regard. However, the presupposition - that prior to the relevant point in time John was smoking - remains constant across all variations. This global presence of the

relevant inference, also referred to as ‘presupposition projection’, is a hallmark of presupposed content. Another important aspect of meaning is that of conversational implicatures. [5,37] A prototypical example is that of the scalar implicature associated with the quantifier *some*, illustrated in (3):

(3) John ate some of the cookies. a. John ate some, and possibly all, of the cookies.

b. John did not eat all of the cookies. Although naive speakers might commonly take (3) to entail (3b), it turns out that the literal meaning of *some* is best characterized as (3a), e.g., because it can be cancelled without any sense of contradiction (3i), in contrast to literal meaning (3ii):
 (3') i. . . . In fact, he ate all of them. ii. . . . # In fact, he ate none of them.

So how does the standard interpretation of (3) as implying (3b) come about? Grice proposed that it is based on the hearer's reasoning about the speaker's role as a rational, cooperative interlocutor that adheres to certain conversational maxims. In the present case, the maxim of Quantity requires speakers to be as informative as necessary, and the maxim of Quality requires them to speak truthfully. Based on this, a hearer can then reason as follows: the speaker did not make the logically stronger claim that John ate all of the cookies, despite being required to be as informative as possible. Assuming she is cooperative, there must have been something else that kept her from asserting the universal claim. The maxim of Quality is a prime candidate - she must have not been in a position to make the stronger claim while also observing this maxim. Thus, the hearer concludes that the stronger claim is not true.³ Yet another class of inferences distinct from the literal, truth-conditional content is that of conventional implicatures, a term also introduced by Grice (1975) (see Potts, 2005, for an influential recent perspective). Conventional implicatures share some properties with presuppositions and some with implicatures, as can be illustrated with the examples in (4).

(4) a. Sue, a pianist, teaches music lessons on the weekends.

b. The damn cat knocked over a glass of water.

The notion that Sue is a pianist introduced by the appositive in (4a) is by no means something that had to be established prior to the utterance, but at the same time, it does not contribute to the main point of the assertion (in denying (4a), for example, one would not deny that Sue is a pianist). Rather, it seems to introduce a side-comment of sorts. At the same time, this information is clearly conventionally encoded, and not inferred via general reasoning. In a way similar to presuppositions, the relevant inference remains constant under various types of embeddings. In fact, conventional implicatures have been argued to (almost) always be present at a global level, unlike presuppositions. Similar considerations apply to the expressive *damn* in (4b).. That being said, the distinctions laid out above clearly serve as the general starting point in the literature and provide a useful basis for further investigations. There are, of course, numerous further ways in which linguistic utterances can give rise to inferences beyond what is literally expressed, e.g., through metaphor and irony. While these also merit more in-depth investigation, we will restrict our focus here on phenomena that are more closely related to the literal meanings of linguistic expressions and which have been explored extensively in formal terms.

Theoretical approaches to presuppositions can be divided along various fault-lines. For purposes of presentation, I will draw the main line between dynamic views of semantics, which see sentential meanings as intimately interwoven with their impact on the context, and static ones, which take a purely truth-conditional approach that does not incorporate effects on the context in the semantics proper. The dynamic tradition, as it has long occupied the perhaps most prominent place in linguistics. The main focus in the latter category will be on recent

developments of so-called modular accounts, which maintain a non-dynamic semantics but incorporate the incremental unfolding of discourse at another level.

The seminal work by Robert Stalnaker (Stalnaker, 1970, 1973, 1974, 1978), presuppositions have commonly been seen as imposing requirements on possible contexts of utterance. For Stalnaker, this is a fundamentally pragmatic notion. His approach is based on a notion of contexts of utterance in terms of the Common Ground - the set of worlds compatible with what is mutually supposed for purposes of communication. Assertions serve to add information to the Common Ground, thereby reducing the corresponding set of worlds. Presuppositions, on the other hand, correspond to what is already entailed by the Common Ground. This view encodes the notion that presuppositions are an aspect of meaning that is taken for granted by the discourse participants.[7,275]

Crucially, the dynamics of interpreting a given phrase in relation to the context extends to the intra-sentential context. This is at the heart of the Stalnakerian approach to presupposition projection. To illustrate with the simplest example, presupposition triggers introduced in the second clause of a conjunction are evaluated relative to a context that already includes the first conjunct. This provides an explanation for the specific projection patterns we find with conjunction: Based on the choice of the first conjunct, the entire sentence either does (5a-i) or does not (5a-ii) presuppose that John has a wife:

- (5) a. i. John has the week off. . . ii. John is married. . .
b. . . . and he's on a trip with his wife.

The fact that the first conjunct in (5a-ii) (plus the assumption of traditional marriage laws!) establishes that he has a wife suffices to satisfy the presupposition introduced by the possessive description his wife. In contrast, variations of the sentence where the first conjunct does not entail that John has a wife, such as (5a-i) will presupposing that he has one.

Recent years have seen various revivals of variations of these approaches, and the differences in predictions between them and the dynamic ones turn out to be more subtle .

One of the most influential recent developments in this area has emerged from work by Philippe Schlenker (Schlenker, 2008a,b,c, 2009, 2010a,b). In its latest form, this line of work has become a compromise of sorts of the types of accounts considered so far, by proposing a non-dynamic recasting of a theory that is very much in the spirit of Stalnaker and Heim. This theory makes do with a semantics that is classical (i.e., without a third truth-value) and static. It represents both presupposed and asserted content in these classical terms, but assumes presupposed content to introduce additional pragmatic requirements. In particular, such content has to be entailed by its local context. In its simplest form, a local context roughly consists of the pre-utterance context and all parts of the sentence that precede the presuppositional expression.[9,321] Formally, the evaluation of a presupposition involves consideration of all possible continuations of the sentence. This captures the incremental effects of presupposition interpretation, in the same spirit as the original Stalnakerian approach. However, an important aspect of this type of theory is that it opens up the possibility of considering the basic nature of presuppositional requirements (of being established in the discourse context), on the one hand, and the role of the incremental unfolding of spoken language, on the other hand, as separate components. While the basic version of local contexts in Schlenker requires any possible continuation of the sentence to be felicitous, the incremental aspect can be weakened by demoting it to a processing preference. This makes it possible, in principle, for presuppositions to be supported by expressions that follow it, though that is dispreferred, because of the preference for incremental interpretation.[7,848]

The resulting type of modular account along these lines is investigated experimentally by Chemla and Schlenker (2012). They argue their data to support the modular approach, in that introducing support for a presupposition after the trigger, thus violating incrementality, seems to be preferred over having no support for the presupposition in the context at all . [10,187]

On the theoretical level, Schlenker's theory of 'Local Contexts' arguably improves on previous dynamic approaches in several ways. First, it avoids a problem of explanatory adequacy that had been acknowledged in the literature for some time. In short, the formal setup of context change semantics does not require the context change potential for conjunction discussed above (parallel concerns arise with other connectives).[6,79] Based on the formalism, an alternative entry for and would be just as possible that reverses the update procedure. Schlenker's approach avoids this issue by basing the incremental effects (yielding asymmetries between the first and second conjunct) on the left-to-right linearization of linguistic structure. This derives (almost entirely) the same results as Heim's theory, but without having to stipulate anything further about the lexical entries for connectives (which are understood as in classical logic)

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KONTEKSTDƏ FƏRZIYYƏLƏR

Məhərrəmovə Suqurə İbrahim qızı

Xülasə

Ümumiyyətlə qəbul edilir ki, ilkin fərziyyələr həlledici olaraq kontekstlə bağlıdır, lakin nəzəriyyələr kontekstin fəaliyyətə girdiyi səviyyə baxımından fərqlənir. Xüsusi nəzəri təkliflərdən geri çəkilərək və müddəaların tədqiqində həlledici olan ümumi suallar üzərində düşünərək nəzəri ədəbiyyatda mərkəzi olan üç əsas məsələ var.

Biz fərziyyələrin onların linqvistik konteksti ilə qarşılıqlı əlaqəsini, xüsusən də proyeksiya hadisələrinin yaranmasına səbəb olan bir çox yerləşdirmə mühitini nəzərə almalıyıq. Nəhayət, status müqəddəratlarının mənanın digər aspektlərinə nisbətən hansı xüsusiyyətlərə malik olması və onları dəstəkləməyən kontekstlərdə fərziyyələrin meydana çıxması zamanı hansı təsirlərin yaranması məsələsi var. Fərqli tetikleyicilər bu suallara fərqli cavablar tələb edə bilər ki, bu da başqa potensial mürəkkəblilik qatını əlavə edir.

ПРЕДПОСЫЛКИ В КОНТЕКСТЕ

Магеррамова Сугура Ибрагим кызы

Резюме

Общепризнано, что предпосылки в решающей степени связаны с контекстом, но теории различаются по уровню, на котором контекст вступает в игру. Отступая от конкретных теоретических предложений и размышляя над общими вопросами, имеющими решающее значение при исследовании предпосылок, можно выделить три ключевых вопроса, занимающих центральное место в теоретической литературе. Нам необходимо учитывать взаимодействие пресуппозиций с их лингвистическим контекстом, в частности, с множеством встраиваемых сред, которые порождают явления проекции. Наконец, существует вопрос о том, какой статус имеют пресуппозиции по отношению к другим аспектам значения и какие последствия возникают, когда пресуппозиции встречаются в контекстах, которые их не поддерживают. Разные триггеры могут требовать разных ответов на эти вопросы, что добавляет еще один потенциальный уровень сложности..

Rəyçi: dosent Əliyeva Zahirə

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NATIVE, NON-NATIVE SPEAKERS OF ENGLISH IN THE WORLD AND THE ADOPTION OF LINGUISTIC RULES IN NATIVE AND NON-NATIVE SPEAKERS

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Summary: A major goal of theories of language comprehension is to describe how people understand what speakers mean from what they say. Though rarely stated explicitly, such theories focus exclusively on native speakers of the language. Yet the use of a non-native tongue is highly prevalent. Currently, English is one of the most widely spoken languages in the world. Though English has one of the highest numbers of native speakers, many more people use it as a non-native tongue. In general, English language is famous in the world as the language of diplomacy, commerce, scientific-technical and mass information. Also, the phonetic structure of the English language has been able to create a unique original sound structure by passing through a series of development stages.

Learnability is a core property of language, and therefore who is learning and using a language has the potential to shape and change the language itself. Since structures which are learned more accurately will proliferate and persist within a language, differences in learners across a population have the potential to shape the structure and evolution of a language.